ABSTRACT The software-defined mobile networks (SDMNs) have been proposed to manage the complexity in communication networks with centralized controllers. In this paper, we investigate a joint offloading and radio resource allocation strategy for ad hoc mobile cloud computing in the SDMNs. Considering the communication and computation cost, a multi-stage buyer-seller game is formulated to maximize the individual utility of mobile user or base station. Then, by taking advantage of the centralized management conducted by the SDN controller, the proposed game can be efficiently operated to reach the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE). Moreover, two typical scenarios, i.e., quasi-static scenario and dynamic scenario, are discussed under the uniform pricing and non-uniform pricing, respectively. Specifically, a pricing-based joint offloading and resource allocation (PJORA) algorithm with guaranteed convergence is proposed for the non-uniform pricing case, which can be readily extended to the other cases. Furthermore, OpenFlow-based scheduling is also developed to realize offloading and resource allocation. Finally, the numerical results are analyzed to verify the proposed algorithm, which is effective in joint offloading and resource allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
With a dramatic increasing number of mobile devices and the resulting explosive growth of applications in 5G, the complicated network management is driven by mobile traffic demand, heterogeneous wireless environments, and diverse service requirements. Since software defined networking (SDN) has been seen as a promising technology to simplify the communication networks [2] , [3] , the software defined mobile networks (SDMNs) have been discussed by adopting the concept of SDN into mobile core networks (MCNs) [4] and radio access networks (RANs) [5] , [6] , respectively. Meanwhile, the development of SDMNs is tightly connected to mobile cloud computing (MCC) [7] , which allows centralized data processing and resource management, making large-scale logical centralized control solutions feasible [5] . With the support of MCC, mobile devices with limited processing capacity and battery lifetime
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basically have one more option to execute the computation of their applications, i.e., offloading the computation to the cloud [8] . Recently, several researches are focusing on computation offloading in wireless networks [9] , [10] .
Considering the challenges of MCC, such as device mobility, energy limitation, delay sensitive, and network connectivity, we study the issue of designing an efficient joint computation offloading and radio resource allocation mechanism. One critical factor of affecting the computation offloading performance is the limitation coverage of short range communication techniques (e.g., WiFi) in indoor environment. Given the fact that users in most situations are moving randomly, it is essential to select a proper network for mobile devices to offload and download tasks. If there are a few neighbor devices (service providers) surrounding an originator (service requester), then they may be capable of processing the offloading workload with long queue time and low efficiency, leading to the poor QoS of the originator. In this case, it would be beneficial for the originator to offload computation to the nearby mobile devices through base-stations (BSs). To achieve efficient joint offloading and resource allocation for ad-hoc mobile cloud computing, we hence need to carefully tackle three key challenges: 1) how should a requester decide the amount of workload offloaded to service providers over WiFi or cellular. 2) when a service provider moves away from the original network before finishing the offloading computation with probability, how can the provider choose a proper transmission mode by taking the communication cost into consideration. 3) if a service requester or provider transmits over the cellular, how does a BS allocate radio bandwidth resource with proper transmit power.
Moreover, to reduce the overhead of complex centralized management handled by SDN controllers, such as massive information exchanged by mobile users and controllers, game theory is seen as a powerful tool for designing distributed mechanism [11] - [13] . Hence, the mobile users can make decisions based on their own interests and devise incentive. Generally, both the individual device with limited resources and the BS are assumed to be selfish and rational, and are unwilling to provide computation or radio resource to the others without reasonable motivation. Obviously, there always exists a trade-off between the benefits and overheads when an efficient decision is made in a self-organization way.
To this end, we model the joint offloading and resource allocation problem among mobile users in ad-hoc mobile cloud computing as a buyer-seller game. Existing literature in resource allocation for task offloading usually focuses on delay optimization, while neglecting the various requirements of terminals and services. Moreover, there is few research considering the dynamic task offloading and backhaul with user mobility. Therefore, this paper aims to consider the multi-objective optimization problem under different user resource constraints for mobile scenarios. In order to reduce the complexity of the algorithm and make decision in a distribute way, this paper proposes a two-level cooperative game framework for buyers and sellers. Specifically, in terms of task processing, the master pays for computation resource provided by the slaves, while for wireless resource allocation, the master and the slaves in the cellular need to pay for bandwidth. Thus, joint offloading and resource allocation can be efficiently optimized through pricing-based strategy. To the best of our knowledge, the contribution of the paper can be summarized as: 1) We propose the price-based offloading strategy and resource allocation scheme in ad hoc mobile cloud. And a buyer-seller game is formulated to maximize the utility functions of the mobile users and the BS, by taking account of both communication and computation aspects. Specifically, two pricing schemes, i.e., non-uniform pricing and uniform pricing, are adopted for bandwidth allocation to maximize the revenue of the BS and slaves, respectively. Moreover, we extend our study to the dynamic scenario where the mobile users would move out from the previous network before returning the processed workload.
2) We then bring the SDN concept to the design of joint computation and resource allocation for the master and slaves. To meet the flexibility requirement of the network, the OpenFlow rules are defined and placed at the user side and the BS side, respectively. One the one hand, the flow table can be rapidly modified at the negotiation phase and workload offloading phase, since different types of traffic are needed to transmit. On the other hand, only the rules of each user will be updated in the dynamic scenario, thus to expedite the process of reaching the equilibrium.
3) We derive the Stackelberg equilibriums for the proposed the buyer-seller games with non-uniform or uniform pricing under the quasi-static scenario and dynamic scenario, respectively. For the quasi-static scenario, we propose a price-based joint offloading and resource allocation (PJORA) algorithm to maximize the individual utilities of the slaves and the BS. While for the dynamic scenario, both the lower and upper bound on the achievable revenue for the slaves and the BS are obtained with different transition probability. Furthermore, we quantify the efficiency of the Stackelberg equilibrium solution by the proposed algorithm over the centralized control in terms of the revenue of the mobile users and the BS.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II first introduces the related work, and then Section III presents the system model. In Section IV, the buyer-seller game is formulated for joint offloading and resource allocation strategy. Section V and Section VI investigate the optimal price for the quasi static scenario and dynamic scenario, respectively. Section VII provides numerical results to verify the performance of the proposed algorithm. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present a brief overview of offloading and resource allocation in MCC, and recent OpenFlow-based solution in wireless network.
A. COMPUTATION OFFLOADING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN MCC
Although the computation resource would be shared efficiently by offloading task to the cloud, additional communication cost between mobile users and the remote cloud should be taken into consideration to guarantee quality of service (QoS). However, traditional remote cloud-based offloading solutions are limited by the wireless link capacity and transmission latency, thus, such powerful remote cloud might not be feasible in wireless mobile scenarios. In [14] , an architecture has been proposed to replace the remote cloud with a trusted and resource-rich computer or cluster of computers, named a cloudlet. By taking advantage of the geographical locations of nearby mobile users and the potential cooperation among them, [15] has proposed an ad-hoc mobile cloudlet-cloud based approach to implement cooperative gaming architecture. And in [16] , an ad-hoc cloudlet-assisted cloud gaming system has been completed for the mobile terminal devices and the diverse network quality for distinct players. Furthermore, in the situation where there is no infrastructure deployed to connect cloudlets, an ad-hoc mobile cloud has been proposed, in which each mobile device equipped with more memory and computational capability works as either a service provider or requester [17] . To upgrade 4G architecture and support new features of MCC, two resource allocation strategies in [18] , accounting for both computation and radio resources, are devised to minimize the energy consumption of the mobile terminals while satisfying predefined delay constraints. In [19] , to optimize the communication and computation resources jointly for MCC in 5G, a mathematical formulation has been provided with constraints of latency and energy. Besides, a distributed cloud approach has also been proposed using intensive exchange of data among BSs, thus, millimeter waves would satisfy the requirement of high-capacity wireless links between small-cell BSs. Reference [20] has considered a MCC system consisting of multiple users, one computing access point (CAP) and one remote cloud server. Together with communication and processing resource allocation, the offloading decisions of all user and CAP have been jointly optimized to minimize the energy and delay, and the formulated NP-hard optimization problem has been solved efficiently through semidefinite relaxation. In [21] , NOMA-based mobile edge computing has been exploited for improving the efficiency of multi-access radio transmission, which aims at minimizing the overall delay for computation and communication. To improve the reliability and performance of ad-hoc cloud, [22] presents an integrated and end-to-end solution for ad-hoc cloud computing environments when users harvest resources from existing sporadically available, non-exclusive and unreliable infrastructures. Compared to the data-center based MCC, the adhoc cloud computing could be more cost effective and energyefficient, by exploiting distributed and dynamic untapped local resources [23] .
B. OPENFLOW-BASED SOLUTION IN SOFTWARE DEFINED WIRELESS NETWORKS
The success of SDN comes from the systematic abstraction of complex network problems, which manages the whole network in a logical centralized way. By applying rich theories and developed optimization tools, programmable control makes a disruptive paradigm shift in the networking via open control interfaces for different vendors. To simplify network management, SDN advocates the separation between the control plane and data plane. Particularly, OpenFlow implements a powerful protocol that abstracts network communications in the form of flows to be processed by intermediate network equipment with a minimum set of primitives [24] , [25] . Similar to OpenFlow, serval other communication protocols between the two planes have been studied in wireless networks. To tackle the problems, such as rigidity to policy changes and difficulty to manage, in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), [26] has proposed a standard communication protocol between the separated control and data plane, named Sensor OpenFlow (SOF), which is the core component of developed architecture in WSN featuring SDN. Reference [4] has designed an architecture consisting of the MobileFlow forwarding engine (MFFE) and MobileFlow controller (MFC), and both the MFFE and MFC are combined with an OpenFlow switch and controller, respectively. Then, each MFFE communicates with an MFC through a lightweight protocol that implements the MobileFlow control interface. Thus, the MobileFlow stratum can be engaged in managing mobile user traffic selectively according to different criteria.
In summary, few literatures have considered joint computation and communication resource allocation by taking advantage of the SDN. Further, an OpenFlow-based communication scheme has not been adopted into the network management dealing with the difficulty of distributed and dynamic characteristics.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
As illustrated in Fig. 1 , we consider a simplified SDMN, where the Ad-hoc mobile cloud network owns the local cloud resources enabled by mobile devices, such s laptops, tablets, and smartphones. Each mobile device establishes connections with other devices via WiFi or cellular, and shares resources among different cloud applications [23] . Hereafter, a user who requests service help from neighbors is called a master. In contrast, a mobile device which provides service to the master for offloading is called a slave. Assume that the workload of one master can be split partially and processed by offloading. Without loss of generality, the offloaded task would not be processed locally, otherwise the master can be seen as an extra slave which accepts offloading requests from itself without wireless communication cost. Due to the coverage limitation, WiFi may not be always available for communication. It is noteworthy that, the cost of cellular communication would be far higher than that of WiFi.
We denote M as the set of masters associated by BS with M = |M|, and S as the set slaves with S = |S|. Specifically, the set of slaves over WiFi is W with W = |W|, while the set of slaves served by BS is F with F = |F|. Then we have W ∪ F = S and W ∩ F = ∅. For the sake of simplicity, we first consider the situation where one master offloads its workload VOLUME 7, 2019 to multiple slaves, and the situation can be easily extended to the one consisting of multiple masters and multiple slaves. It is notable that the both the masters and the slaves could act as buyers.
A. COMPUTATION MODEL
Let L in,s be the size of the input computation data, which is the part of total workload assigned to Salve s, and L out,s is the size of the output data, which is the processed workload to be returned to the master. Here, we define a fraction ρ s = L out,s /L in,s to indicate the type of processing acted by Slave s (e.g., compression or decompression). Generally, the value of ρ s would affect the wireless channel allocation. By sending L in,s workload to Slave s, the master obtains an amount of utility, which is given as [27] 
where Z s is the processing capacity of Slave s. Meanwhile, the computing cost of Slave s to handle L in,s workload is defined as
where b s is the per unit time cost for computation. And for L in,s workload processed by Slave s, the corresponding energy consumed is denoted by
where λ s is energy per unit time consumed for computing.
B. COMMUNICATION MODEL
In this subsection, we will introduce two communication models in details. To model the wireless contention that the multiple access among users share spectrum, some media access control protocol, such as carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) [28] , is implemented for users to capture the channel to transmit data packet. Hence, the expected throughput C w i of User i(i ∈ W ∪ M) for computation offloading over the chosen wireless channel can be modeled as [29] 
where R i is the data rate achieved by User i, and W i > 0 denotes the weight in channel sharing of User i. Generally, a larger weight W i implies that User i is more dominant in grabbing the channel. Specially, when W i = 1 (i ∈ W ∪ M), each user can share the channel resource equally with round robin scheduling. Secondly, as mentioned before, the cellular network serves as an alternative communication mode when a slave moves away the WiFi network, or may help in connecting more slaves once the processing capability of the slaves in WiFi cannot satisfy the requirement of a master. Here, the BS can be a LTE/LTE-A macro-cell or small-cell BS [30] , [31] that manages the uplink/downlink communications of masters or slaves with time-division duplexing (TDD), which has a strong advantage in the case where there is asymmetry of the uplink and downlink data rates. Then, the uplink channel capacity
where B c i and P c i,B are the channel bandwidth allocated by the BS and transmit power in the uplink of User i, respectively. Further, g c i,B is the channel gain between User i and the BS, and N o is the background noise power. Similarly, we can define the downlink channel capacity C c B,i obtained by User
where P c B,i is the power transmitted by BS to User i, and g c j,i is channel gain the between User i and j. From (5) and (6), the channel capacity in uplink/downlink may be severely influenced by the co-channel interference when there exist too many mobile users, thus, the radio resource in cellular network is needed to be optimized especially for the heavy traffic in cloud computing.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we will design a mechanism that realizes joint task offloading and radio resource allocation, under several constraints, such as energy limitation, interference management and delay sensitive. As the number of mobile devices increases, a self-organized fashion would be more efficient in contrast to a centralized way. In this section, we first present one distributed buyer-seller game formulation for offloading and resource allocation, and then investigate the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) of the proposed game.
A. BUYER-SELLER GAME FORMULATION
In our system, there are three types of entities with different perspectives and objectives, namely, master, slave and BS. In this paper, we formulate the master as the computation and radio resource buyer, and the slaves in WiFi networks and the BS as the computation and radio resource sellers, respectively. The buyer would like to maximize his revenue, and at the same time, motivate the sellers to participate by remunerating them so that they can maximize their revenues as well.
Under the above game model, the objective of the master's optimization problem is to make an offloading decision, considering the benefit and costs. Mathematically, the utility of the master can be given as
where
T is a vector of workload assigned to the slaves, and
T is the price vector paid to the slaves with p s denoting the selling price 
, respectively. It can be observed that the utility function of the master consists of two main parts: profit and cost. Specifically, the cellular communication cost is influenced by the time and bandwidth, which are the scare communication sources with mutual effect. Since WiFi is working on the public spectrum, the cost of bandwidth price would not be considered in this paper.
Note that ∀s, L in,s is a function of p s under the buyer-seller game formulation, indicating that the amount of the workload assigned to the sth slave is dependent on its associated price. Similarly, the bandwidth quota B c M that the master is willing to buy is closely related to the price p B,M . Due to the limitation of power, the master should find the optimal workload assignment L in * and bandwidth B c * M within the constraints. Thus, we have the following optimization problem
In (8), (8b) is energy constraint for transferring data. (8c) is the transmit power budget. (8d) and (8e) indicate the total workload constraint and the non-negativity of the workload. (8f) and (8g) imply the non-negativity of the transmit power from the master to the slaves or the BS.
The utility for the slaves in WiFi and cellular can be defined as
and
respectively. In (9), the communication cost of the sth slave is
. Also, the bandwidth quota B c s that the sth slave (s ∈ F) obtains is closely related to the price p B,s . Specifically, when the slave buys more bandwidth, the channel capacity increases, thus, the transmission delay decreases. On the other hand, with more wireless channel occupation, the slave needs to pay more as well. Therefore, to maximize their own utilities by considering the energy consumption, the optimization problem for the two types of slaves can be modeled as
In (11) and (12), (11b) By selling the wireless bandwidth resource to the master and slaves, the revenue of the BS can be expressed as (13) where
T is the selling price vector for bandwidth, and
T is the bandwidth vector.
Since both the bandwidth and power are the scarce resources, the BS needs to find the optimal price p B * to maximize its revenue with its resource margin. And the optimization problem of the BS can be described as
In (14), (14b) is the energy budget prepared by the BS, where the energy consumed by the BS to transfer data to the master or the slave is Q c B,
(14c) and (14d) are the bandwidth and transmit power budget, respectively. (14e), (14f) and (14g) indicate the non-negativity of bandwidth, power and price.
B. STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM (SE)
Problems 4.1∼4.4 together form a buyer-seller game. The objective of this game is to find the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) point(s) from which neither the buyers nor the VOLUME 7, 2019 sellers have incentives to deviate. The SE for the proposed game is investigated in the following subsection. 
Proof : Appendix A.
C. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
According to the fixed point theorem, standard games owning the properties of positivity, monotonicity and scalability are known to admit and converge to a unique equilibrium [32] . For the proposed algorithm, it is notable that the slaves in cellular networks act as the computation resource sellers while the radio resource buyers at the same time. The buyer would like to maximize his revenue, and at the same time, motivate the sellers to participate by remunerating them so that they can maximize their revenues as well. Since the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium have been provided analytically by proposition 5.1∼5.3, the proposed algorithm owns the rapid convergence once the strategies of others are determined practically. Thus, the proposed algorithm has guaranteed convergence. Additionally, in the above formulation, the BS is assumed to charge the masters and slaves with different prices, thus, this pricing scheme can be referred as non-uniform pricing. Specially, we can also develop uniform pricing scheme by setting p B,s = p B (∀s ∈ S ∪ M). In the following sections, both the two schemes are investigated for the Quasi Static Scenario and Dynamic Scenario.
V. QUASI STATIC SCENARIO
In the quasi static scenario, we assume that the sets of masters and slaves remain unchanged during one computation offloading period (e.g., several hundred milliseconds), while may change across different periods, similar to many previous studies in mobile cloud computing (e.g., [9] , [19] ) and mobile networking (e.g., [23] , [27] ). Based on this assumption, the formulated optimization Problem4.1∼4.4 are deterministic programming, which enable us to get the price and allocation strategy for both workload and bandwidth, as well as enlightens us on the joint offloading and resource allocation for the more general dynamic scenario.
A. PRICE-BASED JOINT OFFLOADING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Since the objective function is a concave function over L in,s and B c M , and the constraints are either affine or convex, Problem 4.1 is a convex optimization problem. Therefore, the optimum satisfying Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions is the globally optimal solution [33] . Then, the optimal workload assignment and bandwidth can be readily attained by the following lemma.
Lemma 2: In Problem 4.1, for a given workload price p and bandwidth price p B,M , the optimal workload assignment solutions for the sth slave over WiFi and cellular are (20) respectively. And the optimal bandwidth solution is
Proof : Please refer to Appendix B. It is observed that if the workload price p s was too high, the master would not offload its task to the sth slave. And, the bandwidth B c * M p B,M is inversely proportional to the price p B,M , indicating that there exists a trade-off between the QoS and the cost for the master.
Substituting (19) into Problem 4.2, the optimization problem at the salves' side over WiFi can be formulated as
Note that the above problem is convex, and the optimal price of the problem is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 3: The optimal solution to Problem 4.2' is given by 
Due to the convexity, the optimal solutions of the problem are given by the following proposition. 
Proof : Please refer to Appendix C. It can be observed that, the optimal price determined by the slave in WiFi or cellular are given by (24) and (26), respectively. p * s is closely related to the power of master P w M ,s (P c M ,B ) and the channel capacity of master C w M ,s (C c M ). For lower workload price, the master is willing to assign more workload to the slaves. However, to meet the requirement of heavy traffic, the slaves would pay for more bandwidth with lower price.
Substituting (21) and (27) into Problem 4.4, the optimization problem at the BS' side
Obviously, the problem is also convex, and the optimal solution is described by the following proposition.
Proposition 5: The optimal solution to Problem 4.4' is given by
Proof : Please refer to Appendix D. Thus, the optimal non-uniform price for bandwidth allocated for the master and slaves can be obtained according to Eq. (30)- (33 (19) and (20) , and p * is given by (24) and (26), and B c * is given by (21) and (27) , and p B * is given by (30) and (31) . Specially, for the uniform pricing scheme, the BS set a unified price for the master and the slaves. And the optimal price obtained from Problem 4.4' is given by (34) , as shown at the bottom of the next page.
B. OPENFLOW-BASED SCHEDULING FOR OFFLOADING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION
In OpenFlow, the devices equipped with flow tables are known as OpenFlow switches, which contain a prioritized list of rules that determine the actions of the received packets. Generally, a rule consists of three main fields: classifier, action and statistics [2] . By setting different priorities, only the rule with the highest priority that matches one packet is considered to take actions on it, which would be suitable for the delay-sensitive task.
Based on the above idea, the information of the SDMN can be efficiently exchanged by taking advantage of OpenFlow, and the proposed buyer-seller game can be performed with essential information concerning the whole network. As shown in Fig. 2 , we describe one scenario that motivates the need to solve pricing problem for the proposed game at the negotiation phase using OpenFlow rules. Flow F1 and F2 are the negotiation information between the master and the slaves, and Flow F3 and F4 are the negotiation information between the BS and its associated master and slaves. The buyer determines an initial workload assignment or bandwidth requirement, the sellers provide the asking pricing accordingly, and then the buyer and sellers update the intermediate solution and iterate until both the workload and bandwidth are obtained with the optimal prices, respectively. It can be observed that, for F1 and F2, the role of the BS is acted as an OpenFlow switch (OFS) to deliver packets towards its destinations and to satisfy the operator's requirements (e.g., low latency, low loss rate).
In practice, the operation of pricing-based joint offloading and resource allocation (PJORA) algorithm can be handled in a centralized manner as in Algorithm 1. Firstly, the controller collects the information of the whole network, such as the channel gain g c B,i (i ∈ F ∪ M) between the BS and its associated users, to add new rules the into flow tables. Then, the master initializes the workload assignment uniformly according to the processing capacity of each slave, as well as sets the required bandwidth B according to (29) and (30) . With the workload assignment L in and bandwidth price p B,s (s ∈ F), the slaves determine the workload price p for the master and update the bandwidth requirement B c s (s ∈ F). Finally, with the price p and p B , the master update the workload assignment and its required bandwidth. For the buyer and seller sides of the proposed game, the individual optimization can be processed in a distributed way. The algorithms are detailed in Algorithm 2, Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 1 is executed iteratively, where each iteration consists of price update, workload assignment update, bandwidth requirement update and information exchange (as seen in Fig. 2 ). Note that several iterations are necessary in the negotiation phase in order to achieve convergence the optimal solutions. When the negotiation phase is finished, the workload will be delivery to each slave, by then, the BS will act as an OFS to forwarding the data with proper rules.
VI. DYNAMIC SCENARIO
Due to the mobility of users, the workload assignment and resource allocation strategy may be affected. It is difficult to obtain an accurate predication of that whether a slave would move out of the previous networks (i.e., cellular or WiFi) before returning its processed workload.
In a light workload situation, the entire workload of the master can be assigned in one short period, during which the set W and F would not change. Thus, the master will assign the workload to the slaves according to the W and F, and the BS can allocate the bandwidth referring to F. However, when the workload W is heavy, the entire workload cannot be assigned in one period. To this end, we extend the one-stage buyer-seller game to a multi-stage one by split the entire workload into N pieces, i.e., W total = {w n |n = 1, · · · , N }. For each piece, the problem can be formulated as the buyer-seller game with the existence of SE. Thus the workload W will be processed in N time scales. When master assigns w n at time scale n, the sets of slaves in WiFi and cellular network is denoted by W n and F n , respectively. Since the master can obtain the set of neighbor slaves in WiFi W n and the set of the slaves in cellular F n provided by the BS at any time, the optimization problem of the master can be formulated as Problem 4.1 in a deterministic manner. Similarly, the optimization problem of the BS can also formulated as Problem 4.4 with changing F to F n . However, due to the uncertainty of connected network before returning the processed task, we assume that the W n and F n will change to W n and F n , respectively. Then, the set of slaves that move from WiFi to cellular is W n ∩ F n , while set of slaves that move from cellular to WiFi is F n ∩ W n . Therefore, for the optimization problem of slaves, the expectation of the communication cost will be taken in the objective functions.
A state transition probability can be used to describe whether a slave is in the cellular network or the WiFi network before it returns the processed task. We assume that a state at the cellular network is followed by another state at the cellular network with the possibility q i , while a state at the WiFi network with the possibility 1 − q i . Besides, a slave stays at the previous WiFi network with the possibility u i , and moves to the cellular network with the possibility 1 − u i .
Thus, for the slaves, the utilization function can be formulated as
where (22) and (28) 
s , κ (t) , υ (t) and ω (t) with gradient method. 17: If |U 
Meanwhile, its bandwidth requirement is
Similarly, the optimal workload price for the sth slave (s ∈ F n ) is
where 
From (24) and (37), the workload price determined by the sth slave increases for the utilization of the cellular communication, and the cost will be passed on to the master. Since (37) and (39) presents the expectation of the workload prices determined by the sth slave in W n ∪F n , the slave would claim for additional payment when it moves in F n , i.e., u s = 0. However, for one special case that u s =1, the sth slave is still in W n , then, (37) will be transformed into (24) . It can be observed that (24) serve as the lower bound on the workload price of the sth slave. By contrast, (26) provides the upper bound on the workload price of the sth slave when q s =1. In this case, the expectation workload price determined by the sth slave via (39) reduces the cost passed on to the master.
In the dynamic scenario, the handover happens when the slaves connect different networks, then the controller updates flow tables using the OpenFlow protocol with a global view of the network at any instant. By the aid of statistics field, rules will be modified more efficiently with different priorities [34] . 
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In order to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed joint offloading and resource allocation scheme, we design the following simulations to evaluate their performance.
To evaluate the proposed PJORA algorithm with varied workload W total , the slaves are deployed at different network with different available processing capacity. We consider an ad-hoc mobile cloud scenario where there exits one BS located at the origin with radius 300 m, and a hotspot of To model the propagation environment, the WiFi channel capacity is set to 11 Mbps, and each user share the channel resource equally. For cellular communication, the channel models from [35] are used. The path-loss between the BS and its associated user existing indoor is denoted as P L = 15.3 + 37.6 log R + L ow and the path-loss between the BS and the user existing outdoor is P L = 15.3 + 37.6 log R, in this paper, where Low is set as 1 dB. The BS has a total power budget of P c,max B = 20 W , and the maximum transmit power of master/slave is P max i = 30mW , (i ∈ M ∪ S). Besides, the total bandwidth is B max = 125 kHz [36] and noise power is N o = 10 −13 W . The other main parameters in our simulation is given by TABLE I [9] , [10] . Fig. 3 shows the selling price and bandwidth allocation for the master and slaves, respectively, with different pricing strategies, the proposed PJORA (non-uniform pricing) and CAEA (uniform pricing) [11] . In Fig. 3 (a) , it can be observed that the bandwidth allocation is inversely proportional to the price. For the same W total , the bandwidth allocation under proposed PJORA is greater than that at the CAEA when the individual price for master/slave is smaller than the price determined by the CAEA, while the reverse is general true for the when the price of PJORA is larger than the CAEA. Fig. 3 (b) illustrates that as the amount of workload increases, more bandwidth would be required for workload delivery by the master and slaves, leading to the decrease of the selling price, which is in accordance with the discussions given in Section IV. Additionally, it is worth noting that when W total is small, the workload will be assigned and processed by the slaves in the WiFi network with high priority due to the lower communication cost and high transmit rate.
A. PRICING FOR BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION
As shown in Fig. 3 (c) , it can be observed that the price for bandwidth allocation of the master can always reach the stable status after several iterations. Since the convergence time is predictable, the proposed algorithm based on a game theory approach could be adopted, especially for the multi-user situation. Actually, the uniform pricing scheme with less negotiation owns faster convergence rate than the non-uniform one. However, the non-uniform pricing would take advantage of global information collected by the BS, reaching a global optimum. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 indicate the selling price and workload assignment from the master to slaves in one period, respectively. It can be found that as the total workload W total increases, the workload assigned to the slaves also increases, meanwhile the price is decreases. Fig. 4(a) shows that the pricing scheme for bandwidth would also impact the price for workload assigned to the slaves in cellular, i.e., the price for workload assignment of one slave under the PJORA is higher than that under the CAEA, when its individual price for bandwidth is higher than the uniform price. Then, the workload assigned to the slave under the PJORA is lower than that under CAEA, which is shown in Fig. 5 (a) . However, both Fig. 4 (b) and Fig. 5 (b) indicate that neither the PJORA nor the CAEA has much influence on both the price and workload assignment of the slaves in WiFi. Besides, the workload are assumed to be only assigned the slaves in WiFi when W total is small, while extra workload will be assigned to the slaves in cellular as W total is getting larger enough beyond the processing capacity of salves in WiFi. It is notable that as the slaves in cellular participate in the buyer-seller game, the slaves in WiFi are compelled to receive more workload with lower price, indicating that the competition mechanism in the game could make the resource allocation and utilization more reasonable and efficient. Owning more powerful capacity Z s , the sth slave in cellular receive more workload assignment according to the previous assumption, and the price determined would be higher since the it is proportional to Z s . In the other words, both workload assignment and price determined take account of the processing capacity of salves, which is in accordance Lemma 2, Proposition 3 and Proposition 4. Fig. 6 shows the revenue of the slaves and BS verse W total obtained by the PJORA and CAEA. From Fig. 6(a) and (b) , it can be found that as W total increases, the revenue of each individual slave increases. While the revenue would not always increase due to that fact that the selling price for bandwidth reduces fairly quickly and it plays a dominated role in the utility function. As shown in Fig. 6(c) , the PJORA maximizes the revenue of the BS since non-uniform pricing is optimal from the perspective of revenue maximization of the BS, as compared to the CAEA. In contrast, the CAEA would be optimal for the revenue of slaves in cellular, as shown in Fig. 6(a) . However, both the PJORA and CAEA have little impact on the revenues of slaves in WiFi.
B. PRICING FOR WORKLOAD ASSIGNMENT

C. DYNAMIC SCENARIO
In this section, we investigate the revenue of the BS and slaves for the dynamic scenario under different transition probabilities. Due to the space limitations, we provide only the revenues of Slave 1 and Slave 3 to present the performances of the slaves in different networks. As shown in Fig. 7(a) , it can be observed that for the same u s , the revenue of the slave in cellular increases as q s increases, indicating that a slave could achieve more revenue when it transmits data over cellular with a higher probability. Moreover, it is remarkable that the special case of q s = 1 and u s = 0 has the largest revenue compared the other cases. This verifies that the special case can serve as an upper bound for the dynamic scenario. In contrast, as shown in Fig. 7(b) , for the same q s , the revenue of each slave increases as u s decreases, which also indicates that the slave would obtain additional income when transmit over cellular rather than WiFi. Thus, the special case of q s = 0 and u s = 0 serves the lower bound of the revenue performance. However, from the perspective of the master, it may not be cost-effective when the master assigns the workload to the slaves over cellular, since more payment are needed for the bandwidth utilized by itself and the salves. Fig. 8 shows that as q s increases or u s decreases, the revenue of the BS will increase due the fact that the slaves in the WiFi before would choose cellular to return the processed task with a higher possibility, which results in more bandwidth requirement and thus the more revenue the BS obtains. Specifically, the case of u s = 0 and q s = 1 serves the upper bound of the revenue performance, since all the slaves providing service for the master would occupy the bandwidth resource either receiving the assigned workload or returning the processed task.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the joint computation offloading and radio resource allocation strategies are investigated for ad-hoc cloud computing in SDMNs using a game theoretical approach. Considering both the communication and computation cost, a buyer-seller game is formulated to maximize the individual utility of the user and BS. To fond the optimal offloading and resource allocation strategies, the closed-form solutions are derived for quasi static scenario and dynamic scenario under uniform price and non-uniform price, respectively. Specifically, an effective distributed price bargaining algorithm, named PJORA, with guaranteed convergence is proposed for the non-uniform-pricing case, which can be readily extended to other cases. Moreover, an OpenFlow-based scheduling is also developed for offloading and resource allocation, thus, the proposed algorithm can be implemented with low complexity and efficient information exchange between the users and the BS. Finally, the numerical results are conducted to verify the performance of the proposed algorithm, and provide the lower and upper bound of the revenue of the user and BS. The results of this paper are useful to practically design joint offloading and resource allocation in SDMNs. 
Using the KKT conditions as follows
By letting ∂L w s ∂p s = 0, the optimal selling price for workload assignment can be obtained as in (24) . Proposition 3 is thus proved.
Similarly, (10) indicates the factors impacting the revenue to the sth slave over cellular, i.e., the price charged to the master, the assigned workload and the bandwidth cost. Based on (20) 
From (65) and (66), the optimal selling price for workload assignment and the optimal bandwidth allocation can be obtained as in (26) and (27) . Proposition 4 is thus proved. Additionally, by setting For the BS, (13) indicates the relationship between the revenue and the bandwidth allocation. Obviously, 
From (74), the optimal selling price for bandwidth can be obtained as in (30) and (31 
